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Abstract 
 
Progressive income taxes have usually been justified on the basis of the ability-to-pay 
(ATP) and equal sacrifice principles, but how ATP and sacrifice should be measured 
remains unsettled. In this paper, I present an alternative rationale for progressive taxes on 
the basis of the concept of sustainable heterogeneity (SH). I conclude that income taxes 
have to be progressive for SH to be achieved, and therefore, progressive income taxes can 
be justified without relying on the ATP and equal sacrifice principles. In addition, for SH 
to be achieved, households should also be burdened with taxes to cover expenses for 
achieving policy objectives other than SH in proportion to their incomes, that is, roughly 
in relation to their consumption, such as the case with a value-added tax.  
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1  INTRODUCTION 
 
The fairness of the tax burden has been usually judged by two principles: the ability-to-
pay (ATP) principle and the benefit principle. Progressive taxes have been usually 
justified by the ATP principle, particularly by the equal sacrifice principle that was 
presented by Mill (1848) on the basis of the ATP principle. In this case, if ATP is equal, 
the amount of tax imposed should be equal, and if ATP increases, the amount of tax 
imposed should increase. However, the ATP and equal sacrifice principles do not 
necessarily say that progressive taxes are necessary—it only says that they are allowable. 
Whether a progressive tax is appropriate differs depending on the measure used to 
evaluate ATP or sacrifice (Richter, 1983; Young, 1987) in addition to the shape of utility 
function. But how ATP and sacrifice should be measured remains unsettled. Three 
measures of sacrifice (i.e., equal absolute sacrifice, equal proportional sacrifice, and equal 
marginal sacrifice) have been particularly studied (Musgrave and Musgrave, 1973), but 
which measure most appropriately indicates the fairness of the tax burden is still an 
unresolved question.  
 The equal sacrifice principle has the problem that it potentially violates Pareto 
efficiency and probably usually does (Kaplow and Shavell, 2001; da Costa and Pereira, 
2014). Of course, we can interpret this violation as a necessary evil and may have to 
accept it, but the problems with the ATP and equal sacrifice principles may indicate that 
the rationale for progressive taxes given on the basis of these principles is not necessarily 
sufficiently persuasive and flawless. The purpose of this paper is to explore an alternative 
rationale for progressive taxes, specifically, one that is based on the concept of sustainable 
heterogeneity (SH) that was presented by Harashima (2017a).1  
 SH is defined as the state at which all the optimality conditions of all 
heterogeneous households are indefinitely satisfied. Harashima (2017a) showed that even 
if households are heterogeneous in preferences, there is a unique balanced growth path 
(or steady state) on which SH is achieved. However, SH is politically vulnerable and is 
not necessarily achieved naturally. Interventions by government are necessary to achieve 
SH if households behave unilaterally in the sense that they behave without considering 
the optimality conditions of other households (Harashima, 2012). A government has to 
transfer money or other economic resources from relatively more-advantaged households 
to less-advantaged households to achieve SH. Progressive taxes are a means of this type 
of government transfer, which suggests that without relying on the ATP and equal 
sacrifice principles, progressive taxes might be able to be justified on the basis of the SH 
                                                          
1
 Harashima (2017a) is also available in English as Harashima (2010). 
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concept.  
 In this paper, I show that, income taxes should be progressive to achieve SH. 
This result is unchanged even if taxes to cover the expenses for achieving various policy 
objectives other than SH are also considered. Therefore, progressive income taxes can be 
justified without the use of the ATP and equal sacrifice principles. Households should, 
however, be burdened with other taxes to cover other policy expenses in proportion to 
their productivities, incomes, and approximate consumption, and these taxes should be 
similar in nature to a value-added tax (VAT).  
 
2  SUSTAINABLE HETEROGENEITY 
 
The nature of SH is briefly explained in this section following Harashima (2017a). 
 
2.1  SH  
Three heterogeneities―the rate of time preference (RTP), the degree of risk aversion 
(DRA), and productivity―are considered. Suppose that there are two economies 
(Economy 1 and Economy 2) that are identical except for RTP, DRA, and productivity. 
Each economy is interpreted as representing a group of identical households, and the 
population in each economy is constant and sufficiently large. The economies are fully 
open to each other, and goods and services and capital are freely transacted among them, 
but labor is immobilized in each economy. Households also provide laborers whose 
abilities are one of the factors that determine the productivity of each economy. Each 
economy can be interpreted as representing either a country or a group of identical 
households in a country. Usually, the concept of the balance of payments is used only for 
the international transactions, but in this paper, this concept and terminology are also used 
even if each economy represents a group of identical households in a country. 
 The production function of Economy i (= 1, 2) is  
  𝑦𝑖,𝑡 = 𝐴𝑡𝛼𝑘𝑖,𝑡1−𝛼, 
 
where yi,t and ki,t are production and capital of Economy i in period t, respectively; At is 
technology in period t; and α (0 < α < 1) is a constant and indicates the labor share. All 
variables are expressed in per capita terms. The current account balance in Economy 1 is 𝜏𝑡 and that in Economy 2 is −𝜏𝑡. The accumulated current account balance 
 ∫ 𝜏𝑠𝑑𝑠𝑡0  
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mirrors capital flows between the two economies. The economy with current account 
surpluses invests them in the other economy. Since 𝜕𝑦1,𝑡𝜕𝑘1,𝑡 (= 𝜕𝑦2,𝑡𝜕𝑘2,𝑡) are returns on 
investments,  
 𝜕𝑦1,𝑡𝜕𝑘1,𝑡 ∫ 𝜏𝑠𝑑𝑠𝑡0   and  𝜕𝑦2,𝑡𝜕𝑘2,𝑡 ∫ 𝜏𝑠𝑑𝑠𝑡0  
 
represent income receipts or payments on the assets that an economy owns in the other 
economy. Hence,  
 𝜏𝑡 − 𝜕𝑦2,𝑡𝜕𝑘2,𝑡 ∫ 𝜏𝑠𝑑𝑠𝑡0  
 
is the balance on goods and services of Economy 1, and  
 𝜕𝑦1,𝑡𝜕𝑘1,𝑡 ∫ 𝜏𝑠𝑑𝑠𝑡0 − 𝜏𝑡 
 
is that of Economy 2. Because the current account balance mirrors capital flows between 
the economies, the balance is a function of capital in both economies such that  
  𝜏𝑡 = 𝜅(𝑘1,𝑡, 𝑘2,𝑡) . 
 
 This two-economy model can be easily extended to multi-economy models. 
Suppose that a country consists of H economies that are identical except for RTP, DRA, 
and productivity (Economy 1, Economy 2, …, Economy H). Households within each 
economy are identical. ci,t, ki,t, and yi,t are the per capita consumption, capital, and output 
of Economy i in period t, respectively; and θi, 𝜀𝑞 = − 𝑐1,𝑡𝑢𝑖′′𝑢𝑖′ , ωi, and ui are RTP, DRA, 
productivity, and the utility function of a household in Economy i, respectively (i = 1, 2, 
…, H). The production function of Economy i is  
 𝑦𝑖,𝑡 = 𝜔𝑖𝐴𝑡𝛼𝑘𝑖,𝑡1−𝛼 .                                                  (1) 
 
In addition, 𝜏𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 is the current account balance of Economy i with Economy j, where i, 
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j = 1, 2, … , H and i ≠ j. 
 Harashima (2017a) showed that if and only if 
 lim𝑡→∞ ?̇?𝑖,𝑡𝑐𝑖,𝑡 = (∑ 𝜀𝑞𝜔𝑞𝐻𝑞=1∑ 𝜔𝑞𝐻𝑞=1 )−1 {[𝜛𝛼 ∑ 𝜔𝑞𝐻𝑞=1𝐻𝑚v(1 − 𝛼)]𝛼 − ∑ 𝜃𝑞𝜔𝑞𝐻𝑞=1∑ 𝜔𝑞𝐻𝑞=1 }                   (2) 
 
for any i (= 1, 2, … , H), all the optimality conditions of all heterogeneous economies are 
satisfied, where m, v, and 𝜛 are positive constants. Furthermore, if and only if equation 
(2) holds, 
 
lim𝑡→∞ ?̇?𝑖,𝑡𝑐𝑖,𝑡 = lim𝑡→∞ ?̇?𝑖,𝑡𝑘𝑖,𝑡 = lim𝑡→∞ ?̇?𝑖,𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑡 = lim𝑡→∞ ?̇?𝑡𝐴𝑡 = lim𝑡→∞ ?̇?𝑖,𝑗,𝑡𝜏𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 = lim𝑡→∞ 𝑑 ∫ 𝜏𝑖,𝑗,𝑠𝑑𝑠
𝑡0 𝑑𝑡∫ 𝜏𝑖,𝑗,𝑠𝑑𝑠𝑡0  
 
is satisfied for any i and j (i ≠ j). Because all the optimality conditions of all heterogeneous 
economies are satisfied, the state at which equation (2) holds is SH by definition.  
 
2.2  SH with government intervention 
SH is not necessarily naturally achieved if households behave unilaterally, but if the 
government properly transfers money or other types of economic resources from some 
economies to other economies, SH is achieved.  
 Let Economy 1+2+…+ (H – 1) be the combined economy consisting of 
Economies 1, 2, …, and (H – 1). The population of Economy 1+2+… + (H – 1) is 
therefore (H – 1) times that of Economy i (= 1, 2, 3, …, H). 𝑘1+2+⋯+(𝐻−1),𝑡 indicates the 
capital of a household in Economy 1+2+∙ ∙ ∙+ (H – 1) in period t. Let gt be the amount of 
government transfers from a household in Economy 1+2+…+ (H – 1) to households in 
Economy H and g̅𝑡 be the ratio of gt to 𝑘1+2+⋯+(𝐻−1),𝑡 in period t to achieve SH. That 
is,  
  g𝑡 = g̅𝑡𝑘1+2+⋯,+(𝐻−1),𝑡 . 
 
g̅𝑡 is solely determined by the government and therefore is an exogenous variable for 
households.  
 Harashima (2017a) showed that if 
 lim𝑡→∞ g̅𝑡  
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= (∑ 𝜀𝑞𝜔𝑞𝐻𝑞=1𝜔𝐻 )−1 {𝜀𝐻 ∑ 𝜔𝑞𝐻𝑞=1 − ∑ 𝜀𝑞𝜔𝑞𝐻𝑞=1∑ 𝜔𝑞𝐻−1𝑞=1 [𝜛𝛼 ∑ 𝜔𝑞𝐻𝑞=1𝐻𝑚v(1 − 𝛼)]𝛼 − 𝜀𝐻 ∑ 𝜃𝑞𝜔𝑞𝐻𝑞=1 − 𝜃𝐻 ∑ 𝜀𝑞𝜔𝑞𝐻𝑞=1∑ 𝜔𝑞𝐻−1𝑞=1 } 
 
is satisfied for any i (= 1, 2, ∙ ∙ ∙, H) in the case that Economy H is replaced with Economy 
i, then equation (2) is satisfied (i.e., SH is achieved by government interventions even if 
households behave unilaterally). Because SH indicates a steady state, lim𝑡→∞ g̅𝑡= constant.  
 Note that the amount of government transfers from households in Economy 
1+2+ ∙ ∙ ∙ + (H – 1) to a household in Economy H at SH is  
  (𝐻 − 1)g𝑡 = (𝐻 − 1) 𝑘1+2+⋯+(𝐻−1),𝑡 lim𝑡→∞g̅𝑡 . 
 
Note also that a negative value of g𝑡 indicates that a positive amount of money or other 
type of economic resource is transferred from Economy H to Economy 1+2+ ∙ ∙ ∙ + (H – 
1) and vice versa. 
 
3  POLICY EXPENSE TAX UNDER SH 
 
Taxes are not only used as a tool of government transfers to achieve SH but also to cover 
the expenses for many policy objectives other than achieving SH (hereafter, this is called 
the “policy expense tax”). In this section, burdens of the policy expense tax under SH are 
examined in a two-economy model for simplicity. As shown in Section 2, a two-economy 
model can be easily extended to a multi-economy model. 
 
3.1  Environment 
Suppose that a country consists of two economies that are identical except for RTP and 
productivity, and households are identical within each economy and behave unilaterally. 
RTP and productivity are assumed to be negatively correlated because many empirical 
studies conclude that RTP is negatively correlated with incomes (e.g., Lawrance, 1991; 
Samwick, 1998; Ventura, 2003); this indicates that the economy with the higher 
productivity has a lower RTP than the economy with the lower productivity and vice 
versa. Let θi and ωi be the respective RTP and productivity of a household in Economy i, 
and suppose that θ1 < θ2 and ω1 > ω2, which means that Economy 1 is more advantaged 
than Economy 2. Note that for simplicity, DRA is assumed to be identical in the two 
economies. 
 SH is achieved by the following government transfers from a household in 
Economy 1 to households in Economy 2 in period t  
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   g𝑡 =  g̅𝑡𝑘1,𝑡  , 
 
where I refer to gt as “SH transfers.” Note that government transfers from households in 
Economy 1 to a household in Economy 2 in period t are also  g𝑡 =  g̅𝑡𝑘1,𝑡 because the 
number of households is identical between the two economies. Because 
 𝑘1,𝑡 = 𝜔1𝜔2 𝑘2,𝑡                                                          (3) 
 
as shown in Harashima (2017a), then  
  g𝑡 = g̅𝑡𝑘1,𝑡 = g̅𝑡 𝜔1𝜔2 𝑘2,𝑡 . 
 
A positive value of gt indicates that taxes are imposed on households in Economy 1, and 
households in Economy 2 receive economic resources from the government. A negative 
value means the reverse is true. 
 Let xt be the policy expense tax in period t, and xi,t is xt imposed on a household 
in Economy i (= 1, 2). It is assumed for simplicity that   
  𝑥𝑖,𝑡 = ?̅?𝑖𝛼𝑦𝑖,𝑡 , 
 
where ?̅?𝑖  is constant and exogenous for households, and 𝛼𝑦𝑖,𝑡  indicates the labor 
income of a household in Economy i because α indicates the labor share. Here, Harashima 
(2017a) showed that, through arbitration in financial markets,   
 𝑦𝑖,𝑡 = [(𝜔1 + 𝜔2)𝜛𝛼2𝑚v(1 − 𝛼) ]𝛼 𝑘𝑖,𝑡 
 
and therefore  𝑥𝑖,𝑡 = ?̅?𝑖𝛼 [(𝜔1 + 𝜔2)𝜛𝛼2𝑚v(1 − 𝛼) ]𝛼 𝑘𝑖,𝑡 . 
 
3.2  Non-universal policy expense tax  
3.2.1  The policy expense tax on the more-advantaged economy 
I first examine the case that the government imposes the policy expense tax only on 
 7 
households in the more-advantaged Economy 1 (i.e., the policy expense tax consists only 
of x1,t). Following Harashima (2017a), each household in Economy 1 maximizes its 
expected utility 
 𝐸 ∫ 𝑢1(𝑐1,𝑡)exp∞0 (−𝜃1𝑡)𝑑𝑡 
 
subject to 
 𝑑𝑘1,𝑡𝑑𝑡 = [(𝜔1 + 𝜔2)𝜛𝛼2𝑚v(1 − 𝛼) ]𝛼 𝑘1,𝑡 − 𝑐1,𝑡 + [(𝜔1 + 𝜔2)𝜛𝛼2𝑚v ]𝛼 (1 − 𝛼)1−𝛼 ∫ 𝜏𝑠𝑡0 𝑑𝑠          −𝜏𝑡 − g̅𝑡𝑘1,𝑡  − 𝑥𝑖,𝑡     = [(𝜔1 + 𝜔2)𝜛𝛼2𝑚v(1 − 𝛼) ]𝛼 𝑘1,𝑡 − 𝑐1,𝑡 + [(𝜔1 + 𝜔2)𝜛𝛼2𝑚v ]𝛼 (1 − 𝛼)1−𝛼 ∫ 𝜏𝑠𝑡0 𝑑𝑠          −𝜏𝑡 − g̅𝑡𝑘1,𝑡  − ?̅?1𝛼 [(𝜔1 + 𝜔2)𝜛𝛼2𝑚v(1 − 𝛼) ]𝛼 𝑘1,𝑡 
 
and each household in Economy 2 maximizes its expected utility 
 
 𝐸 ∫ 𝑢2(𝑐2,𝑡)exp(−𝜃2𝑡)𝑑𝑡∞0  
 
subject to 
 𝑑𝑘2,𝑡𝑑𝑡 = [(𝜔1 + 𝜔2)𝜛𝛼2𝑚v(1 − 𝛼) ]𝛼 𝑘2,𝑡 − 𝑐2,𝑡 − [(𝜔1 + 𝜔2)𝜛𝛼2𝑚v ]𝛼 (1 − 𝛼)1−𝛼 ∫ 𝜏𝑠𝑡0 𝑑𝑠          +𝜏𝑡 + g̅𝑡𝑘2,𝑡  
 
where E is the expectation operator.  
 Harashima (2017a) showed that if lim𝑡→∞ 𝑐1̇,𝑡𝑐1,𝑡 = lim𝑡→∞ 𝑐2̇,𝑡𝑐2,𝑡 holds, 
 
lim𝑡→∞g̅𝑡 = 𝜃2−𝜃1 − ?̅?1𝛼 [(𝜔1 + 𝜔2)𝜛𝛼2𝑚v(1 − 𝛼) ]𝛼(1 + 𝜔1𝜔2) = constant,                         (4) 
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and  
 
lim𝑡→∞ ?̇?1,𝑡𝑐1,𝑡 = lim𝑡→∞ ?̇?2,𝑡𝑐2,𝑡 =𝜀−1 [   (𝜛𝛼𝑚v)𝛼 (1 − 𝛼)−𝛼 − 𝜃1 + −𝜃2 − ?̅?1𝛼 [
(𝜔1 + 𝜔2)𝜛𝛼2𝑚v(1 − 𝛼) ]𝛼(1 + 𝜔1𝜔2) ]    
                  = constant. 
 
Because  
 𝜔1𝛼𝐴𝑡𝛼𝑘1,𝑡−𝛼 = 𝜛𝛼(𝜔1 + 𝜔2)2𝑚v(1 − 𝛼)  
 
as Harashima (2017a) indicates, then by equation (4), 
  lim𝑡→∞g̅𝑡 = 𝜃2−𝜃1 + ?̅?1𝛼𝜔1𝛼𝐴𝑡𝛼𝑘1,𝑡−𝛼(1 + 𝜔1𝜔2)    = 𝜃2−𝜃1 − 𝑥1,𝑡𝑘1,𝑡−1(1 + 𝜔1𝜔2)  
 
and therefore, 
  𝑘1,𝑡 lim𝑡→∞g̅𝑡 = (𝜃2−𝜃1)𝑘1,𝑡(1 + 𝜔1𝜔2) − 𝑥1,𝑡(1 + 𝜔1𝜔2)  .                                    (5) 
 
Equation (5) means that, although the policy expense tax (x1,t) is nominally imposed only 
on households in Economy 1, households in both Economy 1 and Economy 2 bear the tax 
burden at SH.  
 The burden on a household in Economy 2 at SH is  
 𝑥1,𝑡(1 + 𝜔1𝜔2) 
and that in Economy 1 is  
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 𝑥1,𝑡 − 𝑥1,𝑡(1 + 𝜔1𝜔2)  . 
 
Because ω1 > ω2,  
  [𝑥1,𝑡 − 𝑥1,𝑡(1 + 𝜔1𝜔2)] − 𝑥1,𝑡(1 + 𝜔1𝜔2) = 𝑥1,𝑡 (𝜔1 − 𝜔2𝜔1+𝜔2 ) > 0 . 
 
Hence, the burden on a household in Economy 1 is larger than that on a household in 
Economy 2 at SH.  
 The ratio of the burden on a household in Economy 2 to that on a household in 
Economy 1 (BD21) is  
 
 𝐵𝐷21 = 𝑥1,𝑡(1 + 𝜔1𝜔2)𝑥1,𝑡 − 𝑥1,𝑡(1 + 𝜔1𝜔2) =
𝜔2𝜔1  . 
 
The burden of the policy expense tax (x1,t) is shared by households in both economies 
with the ratio 𝜔2 to 𝜔1 (i.e., the share of burden depends on their productivities). 
Notice that a household in Economy 1 shares more of the burden than a household in 
Economy 2 because ω1 > ω2, not because the policy expense tax is nominally imposed 
only on households in Economy 1.  
 
3.2.2  The policy expense tax on the less-advantaged economy 
Next, I examine the case that the government imposes the policy expense tax only on the 
less-advantaged Economy 2 (i.e., the policy expense tax consists only of x2,t). By a similar 
procedure to that used in Section 3.2.1,  
 lim𝑡→∞g̅𝑡 = 𝜃2−𝜃1 + 𝑥2,𝑡𝑘2,𝑡−1(1 + 𝜔1𝜔2)  
 
and 
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𝑘1,𝑡 lim𝑡→∞g̅𝑡 = (𝜃2−𝜃1)𝑘1,𝑡(1 + 𝜔1𝜔2) + 𝑥2,𝑡(1 + 𝜔2𝜔1)  .                                    (6) 
 
Equation (6) means that, although the policy expense tax (x2,t) is nominally imposed only 
on households in Economy 2, households in both economies bear the tax burden at SH. 
Similar to the result shown in Section 3.2.1, the actual tax burdens at SH do not depend 
on where the policy expense tax is nominally imposed. 
 The burden on a household in Economy 1 at SH is  
 𝑥2,𝑡(1 + 𝜔2𝜔1) 
 
and that in Economy 2 is 
  𝑥2,𝑡 − 𝑥2,𝑡(1 + 𝜔2𝜔1)  . 
  
Because ω1 > ω2,  
  𝑥2,𝑡(1 + 𝜔2𝜔1) − [𝑥2,𝑡 − 𝑥2,𝑡(1 + 𝜔2𝜔1)] = −𝑥2,𝑡 (𝜔1 − 𝜔2𝜔1+𝜔2 ) < 0 ; 
 
therefore, the burden on a household in Economy 1 is larger than that on a household in 
Economy 2 at SH (see Section 3.2.1). The burden ratio, BD21, is  
 
 
 𝐵𝐷21 = 𝑥2,𝑡 − 𝑥2,𝑡(1 + 𝜔2𝜔1)𝑥2,𝑡(1 + 𝜔2𝜔1) =
𝜔2𝜔1  . 
 
The burden of x2,t is shared by households in both economies with the ratio 𝜔2 to 𝜔1, 
as was also the case in Section 3.2.1. An important point is that, even though the policy 
expense tax is nominally imposed only on households in Economy 2, a household in 
Economy 1 bears more of the burden than one in Economy 2 because ω1 > ω2.  
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3.3  Universal policy expense tax  
I now examine the case where the government imposes the policy expense tax on 
households in both economies simultaneously; that is, the policy expense tax consists of 
both x1,t and x2,t. By a similar procedure to those used in Section 3.2,  
 lim𝑡→∞g̅𝑡 = 𝜃2−𝜃1 − 𝑥1,𝑡𝑘1,𝑡−1 + 𝑥2,𝑡𝑘2,𝑡−1(1 + 𝜔1𝜔2)  
 
and   
  𝑘1,𝑡 lim𝑡→∞g̅𝑡 = (𝜃2−𝜃1)𝑘1,𝑡(1 + 𝜔1𝜔2) − 𝑥1,𝑡 − 𝑥2,𝑡
𝜔1𝜔2(1 + 𝜔1𝜔2)  . 
 
Therefore, the burdens 𝑥1,𝑡 and 𝑥2,𝑡 are shared by households in both economies at SH.  
 The burden on a household in Economy 1 at SH is  
 𝑥1,𝑡 − 𝑥1,𝑡 − 𝑥2,𝑡 𝜔1𝜔2(1 + 𝜔1𝜔2)  
 
and that in Economy 2 is 
  𝑥2,𝑡 + 𝑥1,𝑡 − 𝑥2,𝑡 𝜔1𝜔2(1 + 𝜔1𝜔2)  . 
 
Therefore,  
 
𝐵𝐷21 = 𝑥2,𝑡 +
𝑥1,𝑡 − 𝑥2,𝑡 𝜔1𝜔2(1 + 𝜔1𝜔2)𝑥1,𝑡 − 𝑥1,𝑡 − 𝑥2,𝑡 𝜔1𝜔2(1 + 𝜔1𝜔2)
= 𝜔2𝜔1  .                                      (7) 
 
 12 
As was the case for the analogous situations in Sections 3.2.1 and 3.2.2, the burdens of 
x1,t and x2,t are shared by households in both economies with the ratio 𝜔2 to 𝜔1, and the 
nominal policy expense tax imposed on households in each economy is irrelevant to the 
actual burdens at SH. In addition, equation (7) clearly indicates that, in any case, the actual 
burden on a household in Economy 1 is larger than that in Economy 2 at SH because ω1 
> ω2.  
 
3.4  Similarity to a VAT 
Because household productivity (ωi) is proportionate to incomes and furthermore roughly 
to the amounts of consumption, the policy expense tax xi,t can be interpreted to be 
approximately equivalent to a tax imposed based on the amount of consumption with a 
flat tax rate. Because the tax base of a VAT is the amount of consumption and the rate is 
flat, the nature of the policy expense tax appears to be very similar to that of a VAT. 
 Of course, the policy expense tax and VAT are not precisely equivalent. For 
example, because some income is transferred through gt by the government at SH, 
consumption is not precisely in proportion to productivity so that consumption does not 
increase exactly at the same rate that ωi increases under SH. Therefore, even if a large 
portion of xi,t can be collected with a VAT, a portion of xi,t will still need be additionally 
collected with other types of taxes to achieve SH. 
 
4  PROGRESSIVE INCOME TAX 
 
Section 2 implies that progressive taxes are necessary for SH, but Section 3 implies that 
under SH, the policy expense tax should be a proportional tax, such as a VAT. That is, 
these two different types of taxes need be integrated in a nation’s tax system under SH, 
but how? In this section, I examine this question.  
 The environment for the examination is basically the same as that in Section 3, 
except that I use a multi-economy model with H economies. The H economies are 
identical except for RTP and productivity, and RTP and productivity are negatively 
correlated such that if 𝜃𝑖 > 𝜃𝑗, then 𝜔𝑖 < 𝜔𝑗 for i, j = 1, 2, …, H and i ≠ j.  
 
4.1  Income tax under SH 
4.1.1  The total tax burden 
Section 3 indicates that regardless of how the nominal policy expense tax is levied on 
households across economies, the burden is eventually borne by households in proportion 
to ωi at SH. Taking this into consideration, it is assumed that the policy expense tax is 
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imposed based on the amount of capital a household possesses (equivalently on a 
household’s productivity as well as the amounts of production and income), with a 
proportional tax rate that is common to all economies such that  
 𝑥𝑖,𝑡 = ?̃?𝑘𝑖,𝑡  ,                                                     (8) 
 
where 𝑥𝑖,𝑡 is the policy expense tax imposed on a household in Economy i in period t 
for i = 1, 2, …, H, and ?̃? is the proportional tax rate, which is constant and common to 
all economies. Because 𝑘𝑖,𝑡 is proportionate to ωi as equation (3) indicates, a household 
in Economy i is burdened with the policy expense tax in proportion to ωi from the 
beginning. 
 As Harashima (2012) shows, SH transfers to households in Economy i from a 
household in the other 𝐻 − 1 economies at SH in period t is 
   g𝑖,𝑡 = (∑ 𝑘𝑞,𝑡 − 𝑘𝑖,𝑡𝐻𝑞=1 )𝐻 − 1 lim𝑡→∞g̅𝑖,𝑡 = (∑ 𝑘𝑞,𝑡 − 𝑘𝑖,𝑡𝐻𝑞=1 )𝐻 − 1 (∑ 𝜀𝑞𝜔𝑞𝐻𝑞=1𝜔𝑖 )−1 {(𝜀𝑖 ∑ 𝜔𝑞𝐻𝑞=1 − ∑ 𝜀𝑞𝜔𝑞𝐻𝑞=1 )∑ 𝜔𝑞𝐻𝑞=1 − 𝜔𝑖 [𝜛𝛼∑ 𝜔𝑞𝐻𝑞=1𝐻𝑚v(1 − 𝛼)]𝛼− 𝜀𝑖 ∑ 𝜃𝑞𝜔𝑞𝐻𝑞=1 − 𝜃𝑖 ∑ 𝜀𝑞𝜔𝑞𝐻𝑞=1∑ 𝜔𝑞𝐻𝑞=1 − 𝜔𝑖 }       ,                                                                   (9) 
 
where 𝜀𝑞 = − 𝑐𝑞,𝑡𝑢𝑞′′𝑢𝑞′  is the DRA of Economy q. Because DRA is assumed to be 
identical for any economy (i.e., 𝜀𝑞 is identical for any q (= 1, 2, …, H)), by equation (9), 
  g𝑖,𝑡 = (∑ 𝑘𝑞,𝑡 − 𝑘𝑖,𝑡𝐻𝑞=1 )𝐻 − 1 (∑ 𝜔𝑞𝐻𝑞=1𝜔𝑖 )−1 (𝜃𝑖 ∑ 𝜔𝑞𝐻𝑞=1 − ∑ 𝜃𝑞𝜔𝑞𝐻𝑞=1∑ 𝜔𝑞𝐻𝑞=1 − 𝜔𝑖 )  .              (10) 
 
Note that SH transfers from households in the other H – 1 economies to a household in 
Economy i at SH in period t is by equation (9), 
 (𝐻 − 1)g𝑖,𝑡 = (∑ 𝑘𝑞,𝑡 − 𝑘𝑖,𝑡𝐻𝑞=1 ) lim𝑡→∞g̅𝑖,𝑡 .                                (11) 
 
 Let  
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𝑘𝑖,𝑡 = ?̃?𝑡𝜔𝑖 .                                                      (12) 
 
Equation (12) indicates that ?̃?𝑡 is kq,t in the case that 𝜔𝑞 = 1. Hence,  
  ∑ 𝑘𝑞,𝑡 − 𝑘𝑗,𝑡𝐻𝑞=1𝐻 − 1 = ?̃?𝑡 ∑ 𝜔𝑞𝐻𝑞=1 − 𝜔𝑗𝐻 − 1  ;                                   (13) 
 
therefore, by equations (10) and (13),  
 
g𝑖,𝑡 = ?̃?𝑡𝜔𝑖𝐻 − 1(𝜃𝑖 − ∑ 𝜃𝑞𝜔𝑞𝐻𝑞=1∑ 𝜔𝑞𝐻𝑞=1 )  .                                      (14) 
 
In addition, let  
 ?̃? = ∑ 𝜃𝑞𝜔𝑞𝐻𝑞=1∑ 𝜔𝑞𝐻𝑞=1  .                                                     (15) 
 ?̃?  is clearly constant and indicates the average RTP of all households. Hence, by 
equations (14) and (15), 
  g𝑖,𝑡 = ?̃?𝑡𝜔𝑖𝐻 − 1 (𝜃𝑖 − ?̃?) .                                                    (16) 
 
 The total amount of all tax burdens of a household in Economy i in period t at 
SH (TBi,t) is the policy expense tax plus SH transfers from that household to households 
in the other H – 1 economies. Because SH transfers from a household in Economy i to 
households in the other 𝐻 − 1 economies at SH in period t is, by equation (11),  
  −(𝐻 − 1)g𝑖,𝑡 , 
 
by equations (8), (11), (12), and (16),  
 𝑇𝐵𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑥𝑖,𝑡 − (𝐻 − 1)g𝑖,𝑡 = ?̃?𝑡𝜔𝑖(?̃? + ?̃? − 𝜃𝑖) .                                           (17) 
 
Note that a negative value of TBi,t means that a household in Economy i bears no net tax 
burden but instead receives positive net transfers equivalent to −𝑇𝐵𝑖,𝑡  from the 
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government.  
 
4.1.2  Progressiveness 
By equation (1) (i.e., by the production function), the labor incomes of a household in 
Economy i in period t (LIi,t) at SH are  
 𝐿𝐼𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑦𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼𝜔𝑖𝛼𝐴𝑡𝛼𝑘𝑖,𝑡1−𝛼 = 𝛼𝜔𝑖𝐴𝑡𝛼 ?̃?𝑡1−𝛼                                                          (18) 
 
because α indicates the labor share. On the other hand, because ?̃? is the average RTP of 
all households and the real interest rate rt is  
 𝜕?̃?𝑡𝜕?̃?𝑡 = (1 − 𝛼)𝐴𝑡𝛼 ?̃?𝑡−𝛼 = 𝑟𝑡 = ?̃?                                       (19) 
 
at steady state for any economy through arbitration in financial markets (Harashima, 
2017a), the capital incomes of a household in Economy i in period t (CIi,t) at SH are  
 𝐶𝐼𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑟𝑡𝑘𝑖,𝑡 = ?̃?𝑘𝑖,𝑡 = ?̃?𝜔𝑖?̃?𝑡  .                                                         (20) 
 
 Let ?̃?𝑡 be yq,t in the case that 𝜔𝑞 = 1. Hence, the ratio of the total tax burdens 
to the total incomes of a household in Economy i at SH (TBRi) (i.e., the ratio of 𝑇𝐵𝑖,𝑡 to 𝐿𝐼𝑖,𝑡 + 𝐶𝐼𝑖,𝑡 at SH) is, by equations (17), (18), and (20), 
 𝑇𝐵𝑅𝑖 = 𝑇𝐵𝑖,𝑡𝐿𝐼𝑖,𝑡 + 𝐶𝐼𝑖,𝑡 = ?̃?𝑡𝜔𝑖(?̃? + ?̃? − 𝜃𝑖)𝛼𝜔𝑖𝐴𝑡𝛼 ?̃?𝑡1−𝛼 + ?̃?𝜔𝑖?̃?𝑡 = ?̃? + ?̃? − 𝜃𝑖𝛼?̃?𝑡?̃?𝑡−1 + ?̃?  .                                                                        (21) 
 
By equations (1) and (19),  
 𝛼?̃?𝑡?̃?𝑡−1 = 𝛼1 − 𝛼 ?̃? .                                               (22) 
 
Hence, by equations (21) and (22), 
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𝑇𝐵𝑅𝑖 = (1 − 𝛼) ?̃? + ?̃? − 𝜃𝑖?̃?  .                                       (23) 
 
Equation (23) clearly indicates that 𝑇𝐵𝑅𝑖  is temporally constant. Equation (23) also 
indicates that TBRi differs among households depending on the value of 𝜃𝑖.  
 The right-hand side of equation (23) can be divided into two terms such that   
  𝑇𝐵𝑅𝑖 = (1 − 𝛼) ?̃??̃? + (1 − 𝛼) ?̃? − 𝜃𝑖?̃?  .                                 (24) 
 
In equation (24), let  
 𝑃𝐵𝑅𝑖 = (1 − 𝛼) ?̃??̃?    ,                                             (25) 
 
where PBRi indicates the burden rate of the policy expense tax for a household in 
Economy i at SH; that is, it corresponds to the proportional tax rate of the policy expense 
tax as indicated by equation (8). Equation (25) clearly shows that PBRi is constant and 
common to all economies. 
 Also in equation (24), let  
 𝐼𝐵𝑅𝑖 = (1 − 𝛼) ?̃? − 𝜃𝑖?̃?  = (1 − 𝛼) (1 − 𝜃𝑖?̃? )  ,                                         (26) 
 
where IBRi indicates the burden rate of the income tax for a household in Economy i at 
SH. If IBRi is positive (i.e., ?̃? − 𝜃𝑖 > 0), a household in Economy i has income taxes 
imposed upon it, but if IBRi is negative (i.e., ?̃? − 𝜃𝑖 < 0), the household receives positive 
net transfers from the government. As equation (26) clearly indicates, IBRi differs among 
economies depending on the value of 𝜃𝑖. Note that because 0 < α < 1 and 𝜃𝑖 > 0 for 
any i, then by equation (26), 𝐼𝐵𝑅𝑖 < 1 for any i. 
 Because 0 < α < 1, by equation (26), 
 𝑑𝐼𝐵𝑅𝑑𝜃𝑖 = −1 − 𝛼?̃? <0 .                                              (27) 
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Equation (27) clearly indicates that 𝑑𝐼𝐵𝑅𝑑𝜃𝑖  = constant; that is, IBRi decreases linearly as 𝜃𝑖 increases. In addition, because ωi is negatively correlated with 𝜃𝑖, that is, 
  𝑑𝜃𝑖𝑑𝜔𝑖 < 0 ,                                                            (28) 
 
then by inequality (27),   
 𝑑𝐼𝐵𝑅𝑖𝑑𝜔𝑖 = 𝑑𝐼𝐵𝑅𝑖𝑑𝜃𝑖 𝑑𝜃𝑖𝑑𝜔𝑖 > 0  .                                         (29) 
 
Furthermore, because the amount of incomes (𝐿𝐼𝑖,𝑡 + 𝐶𝐼𝑖,𝑡) is an increasing function of ωi 
as equations (18) and (20) indicate, that is, because 
  𝑑𝜔𝑖𝑑(𝐿𝐼𝑖,𝑡 + 𝐶𝐼𝑖,𝑡) > 0 ,                                                (30) 
 
by inequality (29), 
 𝑑𝐼𝐵𝑅𝑖𝑑(𝐿𝐼𝑖,𝑡 + 𝐶𝐼𝑖,𝑡) = 𝑑𝐼𝐵𝑅𝑖𝑑𝜔𝑖 𝑑𝜔𝑖𝑑(𝐿𝐼𝑖,𝑡 + 𝐶𝐼𝑖,𝑡) > 0 .                          (31) 
 
Inequality (31) indicates that the burden rate of the income tax (𝐼𝐵𝑅𝑖) should increase as 
incomes increase. That is, the income tax under SH should be progressive. 
 
4.1.3  Progressiveness in actual income taxes 
Equation (26) indicates that income taxes should not be imposed on households in 
Economy i if 𝜃𝑖 is higher than ?̃?. This means that income taxes should not be imposed 
on roughly half of the households in a country because ?̃? indicates the average RTP. 
However, in actuality, a majority of households will pay at least some income taxes in 
many countries because the policy expense tax can be levied in various forms, including 
an income tax.  
 Suppose that a part of 𝑥𝑖,𝑡 (i.e., 𝛽𝑥𝑖,𝑡) is levied in the form of an income tax for 
any i, where β (0 < β < 1) is a constant. In this case, 𝐼𝐵𝑅𝑖 becomes 
 𝐼𝐵𝑅𝑖 = (1 − 𝛼)𝛽?̃??̃? + (1 − 𝛼) ?̃? − 𝜃𝑖?̃?                                   (32) 
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by equation (24). Equation (32) indicates that even if 𝜃𝑖 is higher than ?̃?, households 
have to pay income taxes if  
  𝛽?̃? + ?̃? − 𝜃𝑖 > 0 . 
 
An important point is that equation (32) clearly indicates that inequalities (29) and (31) 
still hold even in this case; therefore, income taxes still have the property of being 
progressive.  
 
4.2  Rent incomes and progressive tax 
4.2.1  Rent incomes 
Harashima (2019b) showed that some households can persistently obtain incomes from 
economic rents (hereafter, “rent incomes”) thanks to monopoly rents derived from 
ranking value and preference, a concept introduced by Harashima (2018b).2 Because 
ranking value and preference generate monopoly powers, some people can obtain 
incomes that are much higher than those of ordinary people (e.g., superstars in 
professional sports). Harashima (2017b) showed that companies can obtain monopoly 
rents due to ranking preference and value by differentiating their products. Because the 
strategy of product differentiation is one of the most important strategies for companies 
(Porter, 1980, 1985) and is actually pursued by many companies, monopoly rents will 
exist widely, ubiquitously, and massively across an economy at the present time and in 
the future.  
 An important point, as Harashima (2018a, 2018b, 2019a) indicates, is that these 
monopoly rents are probably distributed very unevenly, particularly to a few people 
involved with the companies (e.g., owners or executives). Accessibility to the monopoly 
rents is highly likely to be heterogeneous among people and family lines, and as a result, 
many of these monopoly rents will probably be enjoyed by only a small number of people 
and family lines. How should we deal with these monopoly rents with regard to SH and 
progressive taxes? I examine this problem in this section. 
 
4.2.2  Rent incomes and the total tax burden 
The environment for the examination is the same as that in Section 4.1 except that some 
households can obtain rent incomes. Suppose that each household in Economy j equally 
obtains rent incomes zj,t in period t, and conversely, the income of each household in the 
                                                          
2
 Harashima (2018b) is also available in English as Harashima (2016). 
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other 𝐻 − 1 economies is reduced by 𝑧𝑗,𝑡𝐻−1 in period t. Households in the other 𝐻 − 1 
economies do not obtain any rent income. It is assumed that zj,t is in proportion to kj,t such 
that  
 𝑧𝑗,𝑡 = (?̅?𝑗 + 𝜖𝑡)𝑧̅𝑘𝑗,𝑡 ,             (33) 
 
where 𝑧̅ (> 0) and ?̅?𝑗 (> 0) are constants and 𝜖𝑡 is i.i.d. with zero mean.  
 Harashima (2019b) indicates that SH transfers to households in Economy j from 
a household in the other 𝐻 − 1 economies at SH in period t is 
 𝐸 (g𝑗,𝑡) = ∑ 𝑘𝑞,𝑡 − 𝑘𝑗,𝑡𝐻𝑞=1𝐻 − 1 lim𝑡→∞𝐸 (g̅𝑗,𝑡)       = ∑ 𝑘𝑞,𝑡 − 𝑘𝑗,𝑡𝐻𝑞=1𝐻 − 1 (∑ 𝜀𝑞𝜔𝑞𝐻𝑞=1𝜔𝑗 )−1 {(𝜀𝑗 ∑ 𝜔𝑞𝐻𝑞=1 − ∑ 𝜀𝑞𝜔𝑞𝐻𝑞=1 )∑ 𝜔𝑞𝐻𝑞=2 − 𝜔𝑗 [𝜛𝛼 ∑ 𝜔𝑞𝐻𝑞=1𝐻𝑚v(1 − 𝛼)]𝛼− 𝜀𝑗 ∑ 𝜃𝑞𝜔𝑞𝐻𝑞=1 − 𝜃𝑗 ∑ 𝜀𝑞𝜔𝑞𝐻𝑞=1∑ 𝜔𝑞𝐻𝑞=1 − 𝜔𝑗 } − 𝑘𝑗,𝑡 ?̅?𝑗𝑧̅𝐻 − 1     .                               (34) 
 
Because temporal rent incomes are indifferent to SH (Harashima, 2019b), 𝜖𝑡 is ignored 
for simplicity; that is, 𝐸 (g𝑗,𝑡) = g𝑗,𝑡. Because 𝜀𝑞 = 𝜀 for any q, then by equation (34), 
 
g𝑗,𝑡 = ∑ 𝑘𝑞,𝑡 − 𝑘𝑗,𝑡𝐻𝑞=1𝐻 − 1 [(∑ 𝜔𝑞𝐻𝑞=1𝜔𝑗 )−1 (𝜃𝑗 ∑ 𝜔𝑞𝐻𝑞=1 − ∑ 𝜃𝑞𝜔𝑞𝐻𝑞=1∑ 𝜔𝑞𝐻𝑞=1 − 𝜔𝑗 )] − 𝑘𝑗,𝑡 ?̅?𝑗?̅?𝐻 − 1  .  (35) 
 
By equation (12), 
  ∑ 𝑘𝑞,𝑡 − 𝑘𝑗,𝑡𝐻𝑞=1𝐻 − 1 = ?̃?𝑡 ∑ 𝜔𝑞𝐻𝑞=1 − 𝜔𝑗𝐻 − 1  , 
 
and therefore, by equation (35),  
  g𝑗,𝑡 = ?̃?𝑡𝜔𝑗𝐻 − 1(𝜃𝑗 − ?̃? − ?̅?𝑗?̅?)  .                                            (36) 
 
Because SH transfers from a household in Economy j to households in the other 𝐻 − 1 
economies at SH in period t is, by equation (11), 
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−(𝐻 − 1)g𝑗,𝑡 
 
then by equations (8), (12), and (36), the total amount of tax burden of a household in 
Economy j at SH (𝑇𝐵𝑅𝑒𝑛𝑡,𝑗,𝑡) is 
 𝑇𝐵𝑅𝑒𝑛𝑡,𝑗,𝑡 = 𝑥𝑗,𝑡 − (𝐻 − 1)g𝑗,𝑡 = ?̃?𝑡𝜔𝑗(?̃? + ?̃? − 𝜃𝑗 + ?̅?𝑗𝑧̅) .                           (37) 
 
4.2.3  Rent incomes and progressiveness 
Because the labor incomes of a household in Economy j in period t are the same as those 
indicated by equation (18), the total incomes (labor incomes plus rent incomes) of a 
household in Economy j (𝐿𝐼𝑅𝑒𝑛𝑡,𝑗,𝑡) at SH are, by equations (12), (18), and (33), 
 𝐿𝐼𝑅𝑒𝑛𝑡,𝑗,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑦𝑗,𝑡 + 𝑧𝑗,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑦𝑗,𝑡 + 𝑘𝑗,𝑡?̅?𝑗𝑧̅ = 𝛼𝜔𝑗𝐴𝑡𝛼 ?̃?𝑡1−𝛼 + ?̅?𝑗𝑧̅?̃?𝑡𝜔𝑗 .                 (38) 
 
Capital incomes (𝐶𝐼𝑗,𝑡) are not affected by rent incomes at an SH that is achieved by 
appropriate government interventions. That is, equation (20) holds at SH even if rent 
incomes exist. Let TBRRent,j be TBRj in the case that households in Economy j have rent 
incomes. By equations (20), (22), (37), and (38),  
 𝑇𝐵𝑅𝑅𝑒𝑛𝑡,𝑗 = 𝑇𝐵𝑅𝑒𝑛𝑡,𝑗,𝑡𝐿𝐼𝑅𝑒𝑛𝑡,𝑗,𝑡+𝐶𝐼𝑗,𝑡 = ?̃?𝑡𝜔𝑗(?̃? + ?̃? − 𝜃𝑗 + ?̅?𝑗𝑧̅)𝛼𝜔𝑗𝐴𝑡𝛼 ?̃?𝑡1−𝛼 + ?̅?𝑗𝑧̅?̃?𝑡𝜔𝑗 + ?̃?𝜔𝑖?̃?𝑡 = ?̃??̃?1 − 𝛼 + ?̅?𝑗𝑧̅ + ?̃? − 𝜃𝑗 + ?̅?𝑗𝑧̅?̃?1 − 𝛼 + ?̅?𝑗𝑧̅  .                                                  (39) 
 
Equation (39) indicates that as with 𝑇𝐵𝑅𝑗, 𝑇𝐵𝑅𝑅𝑒𝑛𝑡,𝑗 is temporally constant.  
 Let IBRRent,j be IBRj in the case that households in Economy j have rent incomes, 
and therefore, by equation (39), 
 𝐼𝐵𝑅𝑅𝑒𝑛𝑡,𝑗 = ?̃? − 𝜃𝑗 + ?̅?𝑗𝑧̅?̃?1 − 𝛼 + ?̅?𝑗𝑧̅   .                                        (40) 
 
By equation (40),  
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𝑑𝐼𝐵𝑅𝑅𝑒𝑛𝑡,𝑗𝑑𝜃𝑗 = −( ?̃?1 − 𝛼 + ?̅?𝑗𝑧̅)−1 < 0 .                              (41) 
 
Hence, IBRRent,j decreases linearly as 𝜃𝑗  increases. In addition, by inequalities (28) and 
(41), 
 𝑑𝐼𝐵𝑅𝑅𝑒𝑛𝑡,𝑗𝑑𝜔𝑗 > 0  .                                                 (42) 
 
Furthermore, by inequalities (30) and (42), 
 𝑑𝐼𝐵𝑅𝑅𝑒𝑛𝑡,𝑗𝑑(𝐿𝐼𝑗,𝑡 + 𝐶𝐼𝑗,𝑡) > 0 .                                              (43) 
 
On the other hand, because 0 < α < 1, for any 𝜃𝑗(> 0), 
 ?̃?1 − 𝛼 > ?̃? − 𝜃𝑗  .                                                  (44) 
 
Hence, by equations (26) and (40) and inequality (44), for ?̃? − 𝜃𝑗 > 0, 
  𝐼𝐵𝑅𝑅𝑒𝑛𝑡,𝑗 = ?̃? − 𝜃𝑗 + ?̅?𝑗𝑧̅?̃?1 − 𝛼 + ?̅?𝑗𝑧̅ > ?̃? − 𝜃𝑗?̃?1 − 𝛼 = (1 − 𝛼) (?̃? − 𝜃𝑗?̃? ) = 𝐼𝐵𝑅𝑗           (45) 
 
because ?̅?𝑗𝑧̅ > 0. That is, for ?̃? − 𝜃𝑗 > 0, IBRRent, j is higher than IBRj. By inequalities 
(43) and (45), therefore, income taxes should be still progressive even when rent incomes 
exist.  
 Note that if ?̃? − 𝜃𝑗 + ?̅?𝑗𝑧̅ ≤ 0, no income tax is imposed on Economy j, and if ?̃? − 𝜃𝑗 + ?̅?𝑗𝑧̅ < 0, Economy j instead receives positive net transfers from the government. 
 
4.2.4  Significantly high rent incomes and progressiveness 
Because rent incomes of households in Economy j are extracted from the incomes of 
households in the other H – 1 economies, the rent incomes of a household in Economy j 
(𝑘𝑗,𝑡?̅?𝑖𝑧̅ = 𝑧𝑗,𝑡) can be as large as almost equal to 
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 ∑ 𝑦𝑞,𝑡𝐻𝑞=1 − 𝑦𝑗,𝑡 . 
 
As a result, the value of ?̅?𝑗𝑧̅ can be far larger than the value of ?̃?1−𝛼 in equation (39), 
which means that the rent incomes of a household in Economy j can be far larger than its 
labor and capital incomes (𝐿𝐼𝑗,𝑡+𝐶𝐼𝑗,𝑡). 
 In addition, by inequality (44), the value of ?̅?𝑗𝑧̅ can be also far larger than the 
value of ?̃? − 𝜃𝑗(> 0) as well as the value of ?̃?1−𝛼. If it really is far larger than these 
values, by equation (40), 
  𝐼𝐵𝑅𝑅𝑒𝑛𝑡,𝑗 ≅ 1 . 
 
That is, the income tax rate for a household that obtains extremely high rent incomes 
should be nearly 100% to achieve SH. 
 
4.3  Similarity to negative income tax  
Because θi and ωi are negatively correlated, θi and labor and capital incomes are also 
negatively correlated, as inequalities (28) and (30) indicate. This negative correlation can 
be most simply described by 
 𝐿𝐼𝑖 + 𝐶𝐼𝑖= 𝜒𝜃𝑖     ,                                                (46) 
 
where χ is a positive constant. Suppose for simplicity that there is no rent income. 
Therefore, by equation (26), the amount of the income tax burden for a household in 
Economy i is 
 𝐼𝐵𝑅𝑖 × (𝐿𝐼𝑖 + 𝐶𝐼𝑖) = (1 − 𝛼) (1 − 𝜃𝑖?̃? ) (𝐿𝐼𝑖 + 𝐶𝐼𝑖) =(1 − 𝛼) (𝐿𝐼𝑖 + 𝐶𝐼𝑖 − 𝜒?̃?)  .                             (47) 
 
Equation (47) clearly indicates that this progressive income tax is equivalent to a negative 
income tax with a nominal income tax rate of 1 − 𝛼 and a tax exemption of 𝜒?̃?. This type 
 23 
of negative income tax was endorsed by Friedman (1962). 
 Of course, there is no guarantee that equation (46) exactly holds in the real world. 
Therefore, a progressive income tax is not always and precisely equivalent to a negative 
income tax. However, because it is highly likely that θi and ωi are negatively correlated, 
the similarity between the progressive income tax discussed in Section 4.1 and a negative 
income tax will actually exist to some extent. Hence, the idea of a negative income tax 
seems to be basically consistent with the concept of SH. 
 
5  RATIONALE FOR A PROGRESSIVE INCOME 
TAX 
 
5.1  Equality and efficiency 
As discussed in the Introduction, the equal sacrifice principle potentially violates Pareto 
efficiency and probably usually does (Kaplow and Shavell, 2001; da Costa and Pereira, 
2014). SH with an appropriate progressive income tax is Pareto efficient because all of 
the optimality conditions of all heterogeneous households are indefinitely satisfied at SH, 
and SH is the only such state in a heterogeneous population. In addition, SH transfers and 
a policy expense tax at SH are consistent with Pareto efficiency, and the policy expense 
tax 𝑥𝑡 is identical to a lump-sum tax if ωi is identical across households. From the point 
of view of economic efficiency, therefore, the rationale for a progressive income tax based 
on the concept of SH is different from the rationales for the ATP and equal sacrifice 
principles.  
 The reason for this difference is that the ATP and equal sacrifice principles have 
to meet both economic efficiency and equal sacrifice (more broadly, economic equality) 
criteria, whereas SH requires only the criterion of economic efficiency. Because the 
economic equality and efficiency criteria are basically independent from each other, there 
is no guarantee that both can be satisfied simultaneously. Economic equality and 
efficiency may, in fact, be incompatible and contradictory. If that is true, when the equal 
sacrifice criterion is satisfied, Pareto efficiency will be always violated. 
 On the other hand, SH says nothing a priori about economic equality and only 
requires efficiency. Hence, Pareto efficiency can be always satisfied. Nevertheless, 
because all heterogeneous households are equally “happy” indefinitely at SH, we may 
interpret that if SH is achieved, economic equality is also achieved. Of course, whether 
this interpretation is justifiable depends on the definition of economic equality.  
 In any case, it will be true that SH expresses some kind of normative standard 
because SH is the only state at which all heterogeneous households are equally “happy” 
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indefinitely. It seems highly likely that many people would agree that such a state is 
socially desirable. On the other hand, whether economic equality is socially favorable 
depends on how economic equality is defined. For example, if economic equality is 
defined as indicating the state at which all households obtain completely identical 
incomes regardless of any other circumstance, many people might consider this kind of 
economic equality to be socially unfavorable. In this sense, SH may express a clearer and 
more widely agreeable normative standard than economic equality.   
 
5.2  Alternative rationale for progressive tax 
In most industrialized countries, income taxes are actually progressive, which means that 
a majority of people appear to agree that a progressive income tax is socially beneficial. 
However, as discussed in the Introduction, the ATP principle does not necessarily clearly 
provide a reason for why progressiveness is beneficial for society. The benefits for society 
are generally explained by the ad hoc introduction of the equal sacrifice criterion. 
 On the other hand, SH with appropriate government interventions inevitably 
necessitates a progressive income tax, as shown in Section 4. If all households behave 
unilaterally, SH can be achieved only through the appropriate use of progressive taxes. 
Achieving and maintaining SH therefore clearly provide a strong rationale for the 
necessity of progressive taxes. Hence, without relying on the ATP principle, we can 
justify a progressive tax on the basis of the concept of SH.  
 
5.3  The benefit principle of taxation 
According to the benefit principle of taxation, taxes should be paid by people who benefit 
from government activities, and the more they benefit, the more taxes they should pay. 
SH transfers are clearly irrelevant to the benefit principle, but the policy expense tax may 
be relevant to it because the policy expense tax is levied on people to cover costs for 
implementing measures for various policy objectives, and these costs can be seen 
collectively as corresponding to the benefits people receive.  
 However, the policy expense tax is in essence irrelevant to the benefit principle 
because, as shown in Section 3, a household is burdened with the policy expense tax in 
proportion to its productivity regardless to the amount of benefits it receives. Collectively 
or as an aggregated value, the total amount of policy expense tax may correspond to the 
combined benefits that all people receive, but there is no one-to-one correspondence 
between the amount of policy expense tax a person pays and the benefits that person 
receives. Even if a household receives few benefits, it has to pay a larger amount of policy 
expense tax if its productivity is higher. Therefore, the results of Section 3 indicate that 
the benefit principle is meaningful only if the policy expense tax is considered collectively 
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or as an aggregated value.  
 The basic or ultimate principle underlying tax burdens is therefore neither the 
ATP nor the benefit principle. SH solely determines how households are burdened with 
taxes except for some local or objective taxes. A household has to pay taxes, and 
furthermore, a richer household has to pay more taxes progressively, to achieve SH 
because SH is the economically most efficient state in a heterogeneous population. In 
addition, it is the only state at which all heterogeneous households are equally “happy” 
indefinitely. Therefore, achieving SH is highly likely to be regarded as significantly 
important and favorable for a society with a heterogeneous population. 
 
5.4  The base of a nation’s tax system 
As shown in Section 3, no matter how unevenly the policy expense tax 𝑥𝑡 is nominally 
imposed on households, its burdens are eventually shared by all households in proportion 
to their productivities (ωi) at SH. Therefore, the burdens of the policy expense tax 𝑥𝑡 are 
similar to those of the VAT discussed in Section 4. On the other hand, SH transfers 
inevitably necessitate the property of progressiveness, particularly a progressive income 
tax, as shown in Section 4. Because government expenditures eventually can be covered 
almost exclusively by the policy expense tax and SH transfers even though a government 
can rely on borrowings for a while, the combination of a progressive income tax and VAT 
can be seen as the base of a nation’s tax system.  
 Of course, many other types of taxes can be introduced. Some taxes complement 
the VAT and progressive income tax (e.g., corporate taxes and inheritance taxes), whereas 
others are used as tools to achieve specific policy objectives (e.g., environmental taxes 
and a tobacco tax).  
 
6  CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
Progressive income taxes have usually been justified on the basis of the ATP and equal 
sacrifice principles, but how ATP and sacrifice should be measured is still unsettled. In 
addition, the equal sacrifice principle potentially violates Pareto efficiency and probably 
usually does.  
 In this paper, I present an alternative rationale for progressive taxes on the basis 
of the concept of SH. A government has to transfer money or other economic resources 
from relatively more-advantaged households to less-advantaged households to achieve 
SH. Taxes are used as a means to implement these government transfers, and I showed 
that income taxes should be progressive to achieve SH. This result is unchanged even if 
a separate policy expense tax is also considered. Progressive taxes therefore can be 
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justified without the ATP and equal sacrifice principles.  
 In addition, the results in Section 3 indicate that the benefit principle is relevant 
only collectively (in the aggregate) to the policy expense tax, and therefore it cannot 
provide any useful information about how much policy expense tax burden each 
household should bear. Because both the ATP and benefit principles do not seem to 
provide sufficiently useful information about the allocation of tax burdens among 
households, it seems highly likely that SH determines each household’s tax burden and 
that the basic or ultimate principle for taxation is neither the ATP nor benefit principle 
but the principle of achieving SH. 
 Progressive income taxes to achieve SH have a similar nature to a negative 
income tax because it is highly likely that RTPs and productivities are negatively 
correlated. On the other hand, the burdens of the policy expense tax are similar in nature 
to the VAT because these burdens should be shared among households in proportion to 
their productivities, incomes, and approximate amounts of consumption. In this sense, the 
combination of a progressive income tax and VAT can be seen as the base of a nation’s 
tax system. 
 
  
 27 
References 
 
da Costa, Carlos E. and Thiago Pereira (2014) “On the Efficiency of Equal Sacrifice 
Income Tax Schedules,” European Economic Review, Vol. 70, pp. 399–418. 
Friedman, Milton (1962) Capitalism and Freedom, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 
IL. 
Harashima, Taiji (2010) “Sustainable Heterogeneity: Inequality, Growth, and Social 
Welfare in a Heterogeneous Population,” MPRA (The Munich Personal RePEc 
Archive) Paper, No. 24233. 
Harashima, Taiji (2012) “Sustainable Heterogeneity as the Unique Socially Optimal 
Allocation for Almost All Social Welfare Functions,” MPRA (The Munich Personal 
RePEc Archive) Paper No. 40938. 
Harashima, Taiji (2016) “Ranking Value and Preference: A Model of Superstardom,” 
MPRA (The Munich Personal RePEc Archive) Paper No. 74626. 
Harashima, Taiji (2017a) “Sustainable Heterogeneity: Inequality, Growth, and Social 
Welfare in a Heterogeneous Population,” in Japanese, Journal of Kanazawa Seiryo 
University, Vol. 51, No.1, pp. 31-80. （原嶋 耐治「持続可能な非均質性―均質で
はない構成員からなる経済における不平等、経済成長及び社会的厚生―」、『金沢
星稜大学論集』第51巻第1号（通巻130号）、31～80頁） 
Harashima, Taiji (2017b) “The Mechanism behind Product Differentiation: An Economic 
Model” Journal of Advanced Research in Management, Vol. 8, No. 2. pp. 95-111.   
Harashima, Taiji (2018a) “Superstars in Team Sports: An Economic Model,” MPRA (The 
Munich Personal RePEc Archive) Paper No. 86360. 
Harashima, Taiji (2018b) “Ranking Value and Preference: A Model of Superstardom,” in 
Japanese, Journal of Kanazawa Seiryo University, Vol. 52, No.1, pp. 27 - 40. （原嶋 
耐治「順位価値と順位選好―スーパースターの経済モデル―」、『金沢星稜大学論
集』第 52巻第 1号（通巻 132号）、27～40頁） 
Harashima, Taiji (2019a) “Why Is Executive Compensation So High? A Model of 
Executive Compensation,” MPRA (The Munich Personal RePEc Archive) Paper No. 
91326. 
Harashima, Taiji (2019b) “Preventing Widening Inequality: Economic Rents and 
Sustainable Heterogeneity,” MPRA (The Munich Personal RePEc Archive) Paper No. 
95727. 
Kaplow, Louis and Steven Shavell (2001) “Any Non-welfarist Method of Policy 
Assessment Violates the Pareto Principle, Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 109, pp. 
281–286. 
Lawrance, Emily C. (1991) “Poverty and the Rate of Time Preference: Evidence from 
 28 
Panel Data,” Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 99, No. 1, pp. 54–77. 
Mill, John Stuart (1848) Principles of Political Economy, Longmans Green & Co., 
London. 
Musgrave, Richard Abel and Peggy B. Musgrave (1973) Public finance in Theory and 
Practice, McGraw-Hill, New York. 
Porter, Michael E. (1980) Competitive Strategy, Free Press, New York. 
Porter, Michael E. (1985) Competitive Advantage, Free Press, New York.  
Richter, Wolfram F. (1983) “From Ability to Pay to Concepts of Equal Sacrifice,” Journal 
of Public Economics, Vol. 20, No. 2, pp. 211-229. 
Samwick, Andrew A. (1998) “Discount Rate Heterogeneity and Social Security Reform,” 
Journal of Development Economics, Vol. 57, No. 1, pp. 117–146. 
Ventura, Luigi. (2003) “Direct Measure of Time-preference,” Economic and Social 
Review, Vol. 34, No. 3, pp. 293–310. 
Young, H. Peyton (1987) “Progressive Taxation and the Equal Sacrifice Principle,” 
Journal of Public Economics, Vol. 32, No. 2, pp. 203–214. 
 
 
